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Abstract. This paper surveys 4 major capital structure theories: trade-off, pecking order, 
signaling and market timing. For each theory, a basic model and its major implications are 
presented. These implications are compared to the available evidence. This is followed by an 
overview of pros and cons for each theory. A discussion of major recent papers and 
suggestions for future research are provided. 
 
 
 
                                                          Introduction 
 
     The modern theory of capital structure  began with   the  famous proposition  of Modigliani  
and   Miller  (1958) that described the  conditions of capital  structure irrelevance. Since  then, 
many economists have  been changing these conditions to explain factors driving capital 
structure decisions. Harris and Raviv (1991) synthesized major theoretical   literature in the field,  
related  these  to   the    known empirical evidence, and  suggested promising avenues for 
future research. They argued that asymmetric information theories of capital structure are less 
promising than control-based or product-based theories. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 forces 
to look critically at the modern level of capital structure theory. The problems of many 
companies were related to their financing policies. The role of asymmetric information and 
agency problems has to be understood better. The market for mortgage-backed securities 
which many believe was in the core of financial crisis was full of asymmetric information 
between investors and issuers. Numerous scandals including the Bernie Madoff’s one illustrate 
the depth of agency problems in finance.  At the same time, old ideas about the link between 
taxes, bankruptcy costs and capital structure were not receiving enough attention in theoretical 
literature until recently while managers’ surveys systematically reveal their practical importance. 
      This   paper surveys 4 major capital structure theories: trade-off, pecking order, signaling 
and market timing. These theories are directly related to asymmetric information, agency 
problems, taxes and bankruptcy costs. After presenting the basic model and basic ideas of each 
theory we discuss their consistency with observed evidence. We also discuss the main 
directions of current and future research on capital structure.        
      Briefly, our conclusions are as follows. First, for the last 20 years the trade-off theory and 
pecking-order theory have been extensively tested. This research revealed an incredible 
complexity of explaining firms’ behavior by using either theory. Taking separately they are not 
able to explain some important facts about capital structure. The marginal productivity of this 
research can be diminished in the future without significant advances in developing new more 
powerful theoretical models. These can be either dynamic versions of trade-off or pecking-order 
theory or models combining both those theories. Secondly, after the publication of Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) the market timing theory had emerged from a relatively “small” argument in the 
end of 1980s beginning 1990s as a separate popular theory of capital structure. Compared to 
pecking-order and trade-off theory the theoretical part of this theory is underdeveloped. Thirdly a 
very popular line of research has emerged which focuses on entrepreneurs’ surveys about real 
capital structure decisions. Graham and Harvey (2001) found that an immense gap exists 
between theory and practice. Further surveys can contribute to monitoring this gap and its 
reduction in the future. Forth, signaling theory of capital structure does not have empirical 
support regarding some of its core predictions. However, several new directions have emerged 
opposite to traditional idea of signaling quality through debt issuance. It seems though that more 
effort is required here in order to create new models which can be considered as comparable to 
either pecking order or trade-off theory.  
 
TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
Basic model, major results and evidence 
 
    Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) suggest that capital structure reflects a trade-off between the 
tax benefits of debt and the expected costs of bankruptcy.  Consider a firm that generates a 
random cash flow   that is uniformly distributed between   and   . The firm faces a constant tax 
rate     on corporate income.  If the earnings are not enough to cover the promised debt 
payment , there is a deadweight loss of     that is used up in the process. This can include 
direct bankruptcy costs such as fees paid to lawyers, and indirect bankruptcy costs such as 
losses due to general lack of confidence in the firm from its customers. If earnings are large 
enough (   ) equityholders receive           . Otherwise, they receive nothing. The 
market value of debt     equals 
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The firm’s choice of leverage is determined by maximizing  . The first-order condition with 
respect to   is 
                                                                     
   
     
                                                                 (2) 
Expected bankruptcy costs and debt 
If   is higher in (2) the equilibrium level of   should be lower. Higher the expected bankruptcy 
costs are, the more advantages are for equity. This result has several interpretations. Large  
firms  should  have  more  debt  since  larger  firms  are  more  diversified  and  have lower 
default risk.  Tangible assets suffer a smaller loss of value when firms go into distress.   Hence, 
firms with more tangible assets, for example airplanes manufacturers, should have higher 
leverage in comparison to companies that have more intangible assets such as research firms. 
Growth firms lose more of their value when they go into distress. Thus the theory predicts a 
negative relation between leverage and growth. Empirical studies generally support the above 
predictions (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Barclay et al. (2006), Frank and Goyal (2007)).  
Taxes and debt 
When   increases in (2),   should increase. The higher taxes are, the greater the tax advantage 
of debt will be. Hence, firms with higher tax rates should have higher debt ratios compared to 
firms with lower tax rates. Inversely, firms that have substantial non-debt tax shields, such as 
depreciation, should be less likely to use debt than firms that do not have these tax shields. If 
tax rates increase over time, we would expect debt ratios to go up over time. Debt ratios in 
countries where debt has a much larger tax benefit should be higher than debt ratios in 
countries whose debt has a lower tax benefit. The evidence is mixed. Graham (1996) finds 
some support for tax factor. Titman and Wessels (1988) find that non-debt tax shields and the 
use of debt are positively correlated. Wright (2004) finds that leverage in corporate sector is 
remarkably stable between 1900 and 2002 despite large difference in tax rates.   A survey of 
392 CFOs by Graham and Harvey (2001) found that 45% surveyed agreed that tax 
considerations played an important role in their capital structure choices.  
Debt and profitability 
    As follows from (2), if    increases   should increase too. Thus more profitable firms should 
have more debt.  Expected bankruptcy costs are lower and interest tax shields are more 
valuable for profitable firms.  The empirical studies typically find a negative relation between 
profitability and leverage (Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and 
French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2007)).  
Debt conservatism  
   The trade-off theory predicts that the marginal tax benefit of debt should be equal to marginal 
expected bankruptcy cost. The evidence about this is mixed. Some researchers argue that the 
former is greater than the latter because direct bankruptcy costs are very small and that the 
level of debt is below optimal (Miller (1977), Graham (2000)). Other research find that indirect 
bankruptcy costs can total up to 25-30% of assets value and is thus comparable with tax 
benefits of debt (Molina (2005) and Almeida and Philippon (2007)). In addition, tax advantage of 
debt can be reduced if one includes personal taxation in the basic model (Green and Hollifield 
(2003), Gordon and Lee (2007)). The reason is that tax rates on the return from equity such as 
dividends or capital gain are often reduced. 
Target debt level 
   Debt changes should be dictated by the difference between current level and (2) (mean 
reversion). The evidence usually confirms mean reversion (Fama and French (2002), Kayan 
and Titman (2007)). Different opinions exist regarding the speed of adjustments. Some papers 
find that adjustments are too slow (Fama and French, 2002). Others argue that large capital 
structure adjustments are costly. Firms may exhibit target adjustment behavior if deviations from 
that target are gradually removed over time (Leary and Roberts, 2005). 
Including agency costs in the basic framework 
    Agency costs arise because managers do not necessarily act in the best interests of 
shareholders and shareholders do not necessarily act in the best interests of creditors. Including 
agency costs in the basic model can help to explain some of the problems of trade-off theory 
discussed above, for example debt conservatism.  If an   investment yields large returns 
equityholders capture most of the    gain.   If,  however,  the    investment  fails, debtholders 
bear   the   consequences.  As  a  result,  equityholders may   benefit from  investing in  very  
risky projects, even  if they   are value-decreasing (“asset  substitution  effect”, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  Debtholders can correctly anticipate equityholders’ future behavior. This leads 
to a decrease in the value of debt and reduces the incentive to issue debt.    Myers  (1977)  
observes that  when  firms   are  likely to go bankrupt in the  near future, equityholders may  
have  no incentive to contribute new  capital to invest in  value-increasing  projects. The reason 
is that equityholders bear the entire cost of the    investment, but    the    returns from   the    
investment may   be   captured mainly by   the debtholders (“debt overhang”).   
     On the other hand some agency theories favor higher debt. For example, Jensen (1986) 
argues that debt improves the discipline of an entrenched manager and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that choosing debt instead of equity allows keeping the insiders’ fraction of equity 
high and thus improves their incentive to work in the interests of shareholders. Malmendier et al. 
(2005) and Hackbarth (2008) present behavioral models in which an overconfident manager 
chooses higher debt levels than does a rational manager.  The overall effect of agency 
problems on debt level is difficult to quantify. Also the general importance of asset substitution 
problem is under debate (Parrino and Weisbach, 1999). In their survey of CFOs Graham and 
Harvey (2001) find this problem unimportant. 
     The above analysis leads to the following. Firstly, empirical evidence usually confirms that 
the leverage should be inversely related to the expected bankruptcy costs and that firms adjust 
their capital structures towards target ratios. Secondly, a mixed evidence exists regarding how 
important is tax factor for capital structure and how sensitive is capital structure to tax changes. 
The evidence is also ambiguous about whether or not firms’ leverage is too low and whether or 
not firms move towards their target ratios fast enough. Thirdly, negative correlation between 
debt and profitability does not support the theory.  
Dynamic extensions 
     In a dynamic setting of particular importance are retained earnings and transaction costs 
which were ignored in the basic model. For example, profitable firms may prefer to retain 
earnings to reduce the cost of raising funds in the future. This may lead to lower leverage as 
compared to static theory. Consider a two-period model where in period   after earnings    are 
known a firm must determine the amount of dividends   and retained earnings       . This 
decision is assumed to be taken simultaneously with financing structure for period 2 investment 
project that costs           , where   and   denote debt and equity. The project 
generates earnings   . The firm faces costs        when raising external funds. Throughout 
the paper we assume for simplicity that investors are risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate 
equals    The initial shareholders’ payoff   equals the sum of first and second-period dividends 
                         , where    is the fraction equity required by investors: 
                     . The investors’ earnings should cover the amount of 
investments.   can thus be written as                             . The 
derivative of   with respect to   is           and the derivative of   with respect to   is 
   . This implies a “corner” solution. Comparing the strategy     with     we find that the 
former is better if   is sufficiently high.  
     Hence a firm with high profit in period 1 should use retained earnings to finance period 2 
investments. A firm with low profit that does not have sufficient funds to finance the project 
internally will use debt. This leads to a situation where low-profit firms have more debt than 
high-profit firms (negative correlation between debt and profitability). This also contributes to the 
debt conservatism discussion since high-profit firms will have the debt level below prescribed by 
(2). Note that if one adds bankruptcy costs in the model, the results will not change: high-profit 
firm will not use debt although the level of debt for low-profit firm will be reduced. 
     Similar ideas have been addressed in several recent papers. Hennessy and Whited (2005) 
analyze a model with equity flotation costs and show that under some plausible values of 
parameters one can observe the negative correlation between debt and profitability. Ju et al. 
(2005) provides estimates of optimal capital structures based on a calibrated contingent-claims 
model where long-term creditors can force bankruptcy if the firm’s value is too low.  They show 
that firms are not underlevered relative to the predictions of their model.  Strebulaev (2007) 
analyzes the model where firms in distress have to sell their assets with discount and shows 
that debt level is below than one predicted by the static models. In Tserlukevich (2008) model, 
investments are irreversible and there is “fixed investment cost” which depends on the existing 
stock of capital.  The model is able to replicate negative relation between leverage and 
profitability. Morellec (2004) analyzes a contingent claims model with manager-stockholder 
conflicts.  The model can generate low debt ratios.  Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) consider a 
model where the firm can maximize the equity value or the claimholders value depending on 
whether contracts can be costlessly written or not. The model can explain slow adjustment 
towards the target debt level.  
    Dynamic trade-off models are likely to provide significant contribution to the trade-off theory.  
It seems though that empirical results and simulated results dominate theoretical results. New 
theoretical results are expected.    
 
PECKING-ORDER THEORY (POT)  
 
The basic model, major results and evidence 
 
Information asymmetries exist in almost every facet of corporate finance and they significantly 
complicate the managers’ ability to maximize firm values. It can be challenging for good quality 
firms insiders to convince investors directly about the true quality of their firm especially if this 
concerns future performance. As a result, the investors will try to incorporate indirect evidence 
in their valuation of firm’s performance, which is done through the analysis of information-
revealing actions. Capital structure choice is often considered under this angle.  
      Consider a firm that is raising funds for an investment project. The investment cost is   . 
There are two types of firm. For type  , the project brings cash flow    and for type   it is    , 
     . The fraction of type   firms is   . The initial capital structure is      equity with   
shares outstanding. The firm’s managers know the firm’s type which is not publicly available. 
The managers maximize the wealth of the initial shareholder(s). The firm has internal funds 
     . To finance the project the firm may use internal funds or issue equity.  
Pecking order 
If   decides to use internal funds, the shareholders’ profit is 
                                                                                                                                           (3)  
If, on the other hand,   were to issue equity, it would be mimicked by  , since the value of 
shares issued by   will be greater than that of  . The shares of   will be mispriced. More 
specifically, investors will require a fraction of equity     such that                   . 
This means that the profit of initial shareholders for   is 
                                  
 
             
              
       
             
                   (4) 
that is less than (3) because       . Therefore   should use internal funds to finance the 
project. In this case   is indifferent between internal funds and equity. In either case the 
shareholders’ payoff for type   is       . 
      Equity is dominated by internal funds in this model. Low-quality firms will use equity as much 
as internal funds but high-quality firms will prefer internal funds. Similarly equity is dominated by 
debt. Suppose that the firm can finance the project with risk-free debt. Then   can issue debt to 
avoid any mispricing. If debt issued by the firm is risky the things do not change much. One can 
show that debt suffers from misvaluation less than equity. The same holds if the firm has 
available assets-in-place. Hence a "pecking-order" emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
     The empirical evidence is mixed. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Lemmon and Zender 
(2007) and a survey of NYSE firms by Kamath (1997) find support for pecking order while 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) and Leary and Roberts (2010) do not. Frank and Goyal (2003) 
show that greatest support for pecking order is found among large firms.  
Securities price reaction to equity issues announcements 
    After the market learns that the firm has a valuable investment project (but before the 
financing decision is taken) the true value of   is        and the true value of   is        . 
Thus the share price is 
                       
 
. However after the issue is announced the share 
price is 
      
 
 . The share price has decreased since investors have figured out that the issuer’s 
type is  . The announcement of issuing stock drives down the stock price. Also since debt is 
less sensitive to mispricing problem than equity, the model predicts better market reaction on 
debt issues than equity issues.  
     Empirically it is observed that the announcements of equity issues result in significant 
negative stock price reactions (Masulis and Korwar (1986), Antweiler and Frank (2006)). 
Announcements of debt issues generate weak market reaction on average (Eckbo (1986) and 
Antweiler and Frank (2006)).  
Negative correlation between debt and profitability 
   Good-quality firms use internal funds for financing as much as possible. Since low-quality 
firms do not have as much profits and retained earnings as high-quality firms they have to use 
external sources more frequently and it will usually be debt. This explains the puzzle about the 
negative correlation between debt and profitability that we discussed in the previous chapter. 
The extent of asymmetric information and pecking order  
    The model predicts that higher extent of asymmetric information reduces the incentive to 
issue equity. For example, if in the basic model      , firms can issue equity without risks of 
being misvalued. Also in this case there is no negative reaction to equity issues 
announcements.        
    The evidence is ambiguous. D’Mello and Ferris (2000) and Baghart, Pasquariello and Wu 
(2008) support this prediction. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) find that equity issues are more 
frequent when economy is doing well and information asymmetry is low. On the other hand the 
greatest support for pecking order is found among large firms (Frank and Goyal, 2003), which 
are expected to face the least severe adverse selection problem since they receive better 
coverage by equity analysts.  
    The evidence supports such predictions of POT as negative correlation between debt and 
profitability, negative share price reaction on equity issue announcements and better share price 
reaction on debt issues than on equity issues. The evidence is mixed about whether or not firms 
follow pecking order hierarchy and whether or not the extent of asymmetric information reduces 
the incentive to issue equity.  
Extensions with different types of asymmetric information 
 
       A rich set of new predictions can arise when one analyzes an environment with staged 
investments where private information is long-term in contrast to standard models where 
insiders receive private information one period before the market. Halov (2006) proposes a 
model that considers a firm without internal funds where the choice of security depends not only 
on the current adverse selection cost of the security but also on the future information 
environment and future needs of financing of the firm. Debt issues today make future security 
issues more sensitive to the degree of asymmetric information in the issuance period. Halov 
finds that future adverse selection costs affect negatively the debt component of new external 
financing and positively the cash reserves of the firm. The paper explains why companies may 
prefer equity to debt and provides an idea about why the incentive for issuing equity depends 
not only on the extent of asymmetric information in current period but also in future periods. 
     Miglo (2009) considers a firm with a two-stage investment project. Asymmetric information 
exists regarding both firms’ quality and their growth potential. It is shown that if the extent of 
asymmetric information regarding quality is high compared to that about growth, an equilibrium 
where high-quality firms issue equity does not exist that is consistent with POT. If the extent of 
asymmetric information regarding quality is small enough while that regarding growth is high 
enough, the firms' behavior will differ from what is predicted by POT. These results can help to 
explain why firms in growing industries do not follow POT. These industries are characterized by 
the high degree of uncertainty about the rates of growth. 
    Another idea is to use asymmetric information about risk. Consider the basic model where 
investment projects are risky and the firm types differ not only in the probability of project’s 
success but also in the amount of profit generated in the case of success. There are two types 
of firm. For type  , the project brings cash flow     if successful and     otherwise. The 
probability of success is    . The same parameters for type   are   ,     and   . Assume    
  . There are no internal funds available. To see why both debt and equity can be issued by 
high-quality type, consider two situations.  First suppose that         (firms have the same risk 
and thus there is no asymmetric information concerning risk) and       . Halov and Heider 
(2006) show that the mispricing of equity issued by   (high-quality type) will be greater than that 
of debt. Thus   would prefer debt to equity that is consistent with POT. Second case is when   
                               
(Firms have the same average value so there is no asymmetric information about the firm’s 
value). In this case firms can issue equity that will have the same value for each type avoiding 
mispricing. For both firms types insiders will require a fraction of equity   such that     . 
   Halov and Heider (2006) predict that a firm should issue more equity and less debt if risk plays 
a larger role the adverse selection problem of external financing. This helps to explain why large 
mature firms issue debt and young small firms issue equity. An outside investor presumably 
knows less about the risk of an investment if he faces a young small non-dividend paying firm 
than if he faces a large mature dividend paying firm. 
     We feel that models with different kinds of asymmetric information have future potential 
especially dynamic models. 
 
 
SIGNALLING    
 
Basic model, major predictions and evidence 
 
     In the pecking order model good quality firms had to use internal funds to avoid adverse 
selection problem and value loss.  These firms were not able to signal its quality by using capital 
structure. We turn now to models   in which capital structure serves   as a signal of private 
information (Ross, 1977).   
   Consider a firm that is raising funds for an investment project. The investment cost is   . The 
project brings cash flow   if successful and   otherwise,    . There are two types of firm. For 
type  , the probability of success is   and for type   it is    ,     . The fraction of high-quality 
firms is   . The initial capital structure is      equity with   shares outstanding. To finance the 
project, the firm can issue either debt or equity. The firm’s manager knows the firm’s type which 
is not publicly available. The manager’s objective function is          . It means that the 
manager  chooses  the  capital structure to  maximize a  weighted  average  of the   
shareholders payoff   net  of a penalty   for bankruptcy. Higher is   , higher is the weight of 
shareholders’ payoff in the manager’s objective function. An example of penalty for bankruptcy 
is   loss of reputation. If   were to issue equity it would be mimicked by  . The manager of   
benefits from getting higher price of shares without taking any risk of bankruptcy. Then the 
shares of   are undervalued. Consider if   could signal its type by issuing debt. Suppose   
issues debt with a face value  . If   would issue debt the expected value of manager’s objective 
function is                      . If   would issue equity then it is         . The 
manager issues equity if                               . This can be simplified to: 
                                                                                                                                       (5) 
This means that if bankruptcy penalty is high enough, a signaling equilibrium is possible where 
  issues debt and   issues equity.   
Share price reaction and securities issues 
After the market learns that the firm has a valuable investment project (in case when signaling 
equilibrium exists) the true value of   is     and the true value of   is      . Thus the share 
price is 
             
 
. However after the debt issue is announced the share price is 
   
 
. The 
share price has increased since investors have figured out that the issuer is type is  . Thus the 
market reaction on debt issues (more generally, on leverage-increasing transactions, such as 
issuing convertible debt, repurchasing shares, debt for equity swaps etc.) is positive. Similarly 
the market reaction on equity issues (or leverage-decreasing transactions) is negative. The 
same results were obtained by using managerial risk-aversion instead of bankruptcy penalty 
(Leland-Pyle, 1977). 
     Negative share price reaction on the announcement of equity issues is usually consistent 
with empirical evidence as we discussed in previous section (similar for leverage-decreasing 
transactions). The evidence about positive market reaction on leverage-increasing transactions 
except debt issues is also quite supportive signaling theory (see Masulis (1980), Antweiler and 
Frank (2006) and an entrepreneurs’ survey by Baker et al (2003)).  
     The evidence on announcement of debt issues does not support signaling theories. Eckbo 
(1986) and Antweiler and Frank (2006) find insignificant changes in stock prices in response to 
straight corporate debt issues.  
Firm’s performance and securities issues 
    If a separating equilibrium exists, high-quality firms issue debt and low-quality firms issue 
equity. The empirical prediction is that firm   value (or profitability) and   the debt-equity ratio is 
positively related. The evidence is ambiguous. Most empirical studies report a negative relation 
between leverage and profitability as we discussed earlier. In a similar spirit some studies 
document the superior absolute performance of equity issuing firms before the issue and 
immediately after the issue (Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1997)). On the other 
hand, several studies examine long-term firm performance subsequent to capital structure 
changes. Shah (1994) report that business risk dropped (rose) after leverage-increasing 
(decreasing) exchange offers. The long run operating underperformance of equity issuing firms 
compared to non-issuing firms has been documented (Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson et al. 
(1997) and Loughran and Ritter (1997)).  
    The empirical evidence supports such predictions of signaling theory as negative market 
reaction on leverage-decreasing transactions and positive reaction on leverage-increasing 
transactions (excluding debt issues). The evidence is not supportive regarding market reaction 
to debt issues and negative correlation between debt and profitability. Also how to explain that 
shortly after the issue firms issuing equity have better operating performance than non-issuing 
firms and in the long run they tend to underperform those firms? Many ideas have been 
developed to explain why high-profit firms may use equity as a signal. These include signaling 
low variance of earnings, signaling medium-level earnings in the model with 3 types of firms, 
signaling in a model that combines asymmetric information with agency problems (Brick, 
Frierman and Kim (1998), Noe (1988), Noe and Rebello (1996)) etc. A challenge for 
researchers today is to find a model which will be able to explain several major empirical 
phenomena simultaneously. From our prospective, two directions can be considered as most 
prominent: dynamic extensions of signaling models and security design models. 
Dynamic extensions 
   Dynamic models allow focusing on a firm’s performance profile over time and its effect on 
leverage which is empirically puzzling.   One example is Miglo (2007). Consider a firm that 
invests in a project with cost   in each of two periods,      .  In each period the project may be 
either successful or unsuccessful.  A firm’s insiders have private information about the 
probability of success in each stage. The firms are of two types, type   and type  , with 
respective probabilities of success     and     in stage  .  
      Suppose   issues equity for each stage of investments and distributes period 1 earnings as 
dividends. In stage   the investors will require a fraction of equity    such that:         . In 
stage   investors will require a fraction of equity    such that:                    . Now 
consider the payoff of shareholders of   in case   decides to mimick  .  It equals          
               . If a signaling equilibrium exists, the shareholders’ payoff for type    is 
           (the true value of  ). Thus a separating equilibrium exists if           
                           . This can be simplified to: 
                                                       
          
          
 
         
                
                                                  (6) 
If the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms’ total values is sufficiently small and also 
if          and         , then (6) holds. In extreme case, for example, when            
          , (6) becomes            The idea is that the value of shares in period 1 depends 
on the firm's total value and not on the firm performance in one particular period while the value 
of shares in period 2 depends on period 2 performance. Type with low overall value can benefit 
from overvaluation in period 1 but can have a loss from period 2 undervaluation. When 
asymmetric information regarding firms’ overall values is relatively small while that about timing 
of earnings is high the latter effect can dominate. 
       A separating equilibrium where only high-value firms issue equity implies that firms issuing 
equity have better operating performance at the moment of issue or soon after the issue, and 
that these firms have lower operating performance in the long run. It also explains negative 
correlation between debt and profitability since more profitable firms in the first period issue 
equity.  
     Hennesy et al (2005) develop a dynamic model of the firm under repeated hidden 
information. In equilibrium firms signal positive information by substituting debt for equity. This  
explains the inverse relation between leverage and net worth. Firms with negative private 
information are unlevered. This is consistent with debt conservatism. The model generates a 
number of other predictions.  
Security design, informed investors and information production 
   Sometime investors (for example banks) may produce information on firm’s quality. Fulghieri 
and Lukin (2001) show that good firms will want to partition their securities so that some of the 
claims will be informationally sensitive.  If the cost of becoming informed is low and the degree 
of asymmetric information is high, firms may prefer a higher information sensitive security, such 
as equity, to promote information production by “specialized” outside investors.  Increased 
informed trading reduces information asymmetry and promotes trading. This explains negative 
correlation between debt and the firm’s value because low-profitable firms do not need to issue 
equity which is sensitive to firm’s value. This also predicts that firms with larger growth 
opportunities and younger firms are more likely to be equity financed that is related to our 
discussion in POT. 
     Inderst and Mueller (2006) analyze a model where investors are better informed than 
insiders. Safe projects that are likely to break even based on easily verifiable (hard) information 
are financed with debt. Risky projects that are less likely to break even based on hard 
information are financed with equity. This explains why high-growth firms are financed with 
equity.  
 
MARKET TIMING 
  
The basic model, major results and evidence 
 
    The idea is that the decisions to issue equity depend on market performance (Lucas and 
McDonald (1990) and Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992)). Consider a firm that is raising 
equity for an investment project. The investment cost is   . The cash flow from the project 
equals  . There are two types of firm. Type   has assets in place which generate a cash flow    
in addition to the cash flow from the project. Type   does not have any assets in place.   is a 
publicly available parameter that depends on macroeconomic situation. The firm’s type is its 
private information. The initial capital structure is 100%  equity.  
    Three situations are possible. 
1     . In this case neither firm issues equity and undertakes the project. Both types of firm 
have negative net-present-value (NPV) projects. 
2.     
        
 
   In this case   issues equity and invests in the project and   does not. 
Indeed investors will require fraction    of  ‘s equity such that     . If   mimicks   and issues 
equity, then the shareholders’ payoff is           . To sustain an equilibrium, this should be 
less than  . One can check that it holds if   
        
 
  
3.   
        
 
   Both types issue equity and undertake the project.   is undervalued and   is 
overvalued. 
Equity issues and business cycle 
The model predicts that when the economy is bad (  is low), firms do not issue equity. When 
economy is in the middle stage, equity will be issued by some firms and when economy is 
booming, equity issues are large.   Empirical work by Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), and Baker and Wurgler (2000) suggests a positive relation 
between equity issues and the business cycle.  
Market timing 
When     
        
 
 ,   has positive NPV project but it is undervalued if it decides to issue. If 
  
        
 
,   is undervalued as well but the undervaluation is less severe. In the latter case   
is overvalued. An interpretation is that overvalued firms always issue equity. Undervalued firms 
may wait until the cost of misvaluation will be low enough to be outweighed by the benefits from 
new projects.  
    Empirical evidence supports the prediction that share price performance is important for 
equity issues decisions (see Rajan and Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and 
entrepreneurs’ surveys by Kamath’s (1997) and Graham and Harvey (2001)). Mixed evidence 
exists regarding whether investors overpay for shares or not. Some researchers argue that 
investors tend to be overoptimistic during new issues that the analysts’ forecasts are 
inadequately high and that managers manipulate earnings prior to going public (Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998)). Some research argues in favor of efficient 
market version of the market timing argument (Hansen and Sarin (1998), Knill and Lee (2006)). 
Some research suggests that market timing is not based on good market performance as 
compared to firm’s predicted performance. Instead it is based on the market performance prior 
to the issue (“pseudo-market timing”, Schultz (2003) and Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005)).  
Stock returns and equity issues 
   If the arrival of growth opportunities  is  independent  of price history,  then  overvalued  firms  
will  experience  average  performance  before  the  issue  and undervalued  firms will have 
above-average performance as they wait  for the price to improve before they issue equity. 
Thus, on average, positive abnormal returns will precede equity issues. The evidence confirms 
this prediction (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990), Loughran and Ritter (1995)).  
Extent of asymmetric information and equity issues 
   In the model the extent of asymmetric information can be measured by parameter  . Large   
means that a large difference exists between types and vice versa. The model suggests that 
high   makes equity issues less frequent and vice versa. There are several interpretations of this 
result. After information  releases,  asymmetric  information  should  be  reduced. This is a good 
time to conduct equity issues. As time passes, managers receive  new  information and the 
degree of asymmetry  increases. Thus, the magnitude of the price decline associated with a 
stock issue announcement should be positively related to the time between the last information 
release and the issue. Korajczyk et al (1991)  find  that equity issues tend cluster earlier within a 
quarter, which  is consistent with the release of quarterly earnings announcements, and that 
issues trail off near the end of the quarter. Also, few firms  issue equity prior to the release of 
their annual report and  that larger  firms, which  suffer  less  from asymmetric information, issue 
equity later.  
     Chang et al. (2006) argue that information asymmetry affects a firm's incentives to time the 
market. They show that firms with low information asymmetries (the ones with greater analyst 
coverage) have lower incentives to time the market. Firms followed by fewer analysts make 
infrequent but larger issues of equity.     
     Evidence mostly supports the market timing theory in that managers wait until the market 
conditions get better, that stocks have high return prior to equity issues and that prior to issue 
firms window-dress or improve their performance.  Mixed evidence exists regarding whether 
investors overpay for shares. Also can we use the market timing theory to explain numerous 
phenomena about capital structure which we discussed in previous sections? The fact is that we 
lack theoretical models on market timing. As a result the authors have sometimes different 
opinion about the interpretation of market timing.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
   This paper surveyed 4 major theories of capital structure: trade-off, pecking order, signaling 
and market timing. Empirical evidence usually confirms the main prediction of trade-off theory 
that the leverage should be inversely related to the expected bankruptcy costs. The pecking 
order theory provides explanations for such phenomena as negative correlation between debt 
and profitability, negative share price reaction on equity issue announcements and better share 
price reaction on debt issues than on equity issues. Signaling theory is useful in explaining 
negative market reaction on a broad range of leverage-decreasing transactions and positive 
reaction for some leverage-increasing transactions (excluding debt issues). Evidence mostly 
support market timing theory in that managers wait until the market conditions get better and 
that stock have high return prior to equity issues and that prior to issue firms window-dress or 
improve their performance at least on paper. 
   Also some considerable results have been attained recently to mitigate such long time 
problems for trade-off theory as debt conservatism and low sensitivity of debt with regard to tax 
changes. Considerable results have also been obtained about how to explain equity issues in 
the framework of pecking-order theory and signaling theories.  
  The overall situation is interesting: the trade-off theory can explain a lot of facts about capital 
structure, and it does not have many weaknesses except one which is very important: negative 
correlation between debt and profitability. The only theory which provides the straight 
explanation for this phenomenon is the pecking-order theory which on the other hand has mixed 
evidence regarding the pecking order itself.  
   Our feeling is that in the future dynamic models which incorporate both asymmetric 
information and trade-off ideas including agency costs need to be developed which will provide 
not only simulated result but also theoretical results in order to be comparable with basic 
theories. New theoretical models are required for market timing theory as well. 
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